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INTRODUCTION 
Despite its plain architecture and slightly unappealing location, the 
Great or St. James’ Church in The Hague is one of the best-known 
churches in The Netherlands. Constantijn and Christiaan Huygens, two 
prominent representatives of Dutch Renaissance diplomacy and 
scholarship, were buried here. It is the place where since early seventeenth 
century members of the Dutch royal family have been baptized and where 
royal weddings took place. And it boasts an organ that has attracted 
attention from musicians all over Europe, including Camille Saint-Saëns 
and Albert Schweitzer. 
On January 11, 2013, about five hundred people working in the 
Dutch financial services industry gathered in the Saint James Church, 
solemnly, and aware of the fact that they were part of something truly 
unique.1 What was happening? In September 2008 Lehman Brothers 
collapsed. While the Dutch financial world was not as internationally 
connected as American or British finance, Dutch banks suffered serious 
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blows in the crisis that followed. One bank had to be bailed out,2 another 
was nationalized,3 a third one forced to merge,4 and the fourth received a 
fine of one billion dollars after it was discovered to be part of a massive 
scam involving the manipulation of the Libor.5 The crisis hurt. 
In the early days of the crisis, however, the Dutch financial services 
industry was quick and still optimistic in its reaction to the events 
unfolding on Wall Street. About a month after Lehman’s collapse, the 
Netherlands Bankers Association installed a committee to advise the 
Dutch banking sector and government on how to respond to the crisis. In 
early 2009, the committee published a report with the title Restoring Trust, 
which put forward suggestions concerning corporate governance, 
remuneration policies, risk management, internal and external audit, the 
deposit-guarantee scheme, and several other topics.6 Important parts of the 
report were turned into law. The resulting Banking Code, published in 
September 2009, operates as a code of conduct under the Dutch civil law, 
since January 2010.7 
The suggestions made in the report were not all entirely original. 
Significant parts were indebted to work carried out by the Institute of 
International Finance, as well as by the De Larosière group created by the 
European Commission’s president. Some of the recommendations bear 
great similarity to the Dutch Corporate Governance code.8 The report did, 
however, contain a very interesting novelty that made Dutch finance’s 
response to the crisis internationally unique: It recommended that every 
finance executive would pledge an oath—in bureaucratic parlance, a 
“moral and ethical conduct declaration.”9 What happened in the church in 
The Hague in January 2013 was a public ceremony in which key 
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representatives of Dutch finance pledged this oath: They read the text out 
loud, made relevant gestures, and ended with an appeal to the assistance 
of God Almighty, or a secular version thereof.10 
It is too easy to set this “Bankers Oath” aside as hopelessly naive. 
And it is probably too cynical to describe it as part of diversionary tactics 
designed by the finance industry. All the same, there are very good prima 
facie reasons why one should seriously question the cogency of oaths as 
instruments to manage corporate culture. To declare that one will act with 
integrity, obey the law, put client interests first, keep secret what one was 
entrusted, and not to abuse one’s knowledge—people who follow these 
prescripts will follow them without an oath, and those who do not follow 
them will not change their attitude by swearing an oath. Oaths are useless. 
Or so it may seem. 
While oaths may well be the oldest ethics instrument (the 
Hippocratic Oath dates back to 400 B.C.), they seemed to have lost much 
of their appeal during the twentieth century—except for the Physicians 
Oath and the Oath of Office. Yet interestingly, the Dutch initiative was 
part of a reinvigoration of oaths, as is witnessed by the fact that we now 
have: the University Manager’s Oath, the Fiduciary Oath of the National 
Association of Personal Financial Advisors, the Financial Hippocratic 
Oath, the Financial Modeler’s Oath, the Banking and Finance Oath, the 
Asset Manager’s Oath, the Microbanker’s Oath, the Attorney’s Oath, the 
Engineer’s Hippocratic Oath, the Enterprise Architect’s Professional 
Oath, the Oath of the Pharmacist, the Veterinarian’s Oath, the Knowledge 
Engineer’s Oath, the Pledge of the Computing Professional, the Public 
Health Oath, the Social Work Professional Oath, and the Scientist’s 
Oath.11 We also have the Economist’s Oath, developed by U.S. economist 
George DeMartino, which comes as part of an elaborately argued code of 
ethics for the economics profession.12 And we have what is certainly the 
most prominent oath to date, the MBA Oath, which was developed by Max 
Anderson and Peter Escher in 2010—two Harvard Business School 
graduates, and which has attracted more than 11,000 signatories at the 
moment of writing this Article.13 Moreover, the Dutch government was 
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not alone to suggest an oath for finance; the British government,14 the 
Australian Banking and Finance Ethics panel,15 and individuals such as 
investor James Montier, Barry Morgan, the Archbishop of Wales, and 
HSBC chairman Douglas Flint16 have proffered similar ideas. Also, before 
the MBA Oath, oaths for the business world had already been suggested 
in discussions at the 2002 World Economic Forum in Geneva, and in an 
early publication in a key scholarly journal in business ethics.17 
This Article does not assume that professional oaths accomplish what 
they are intended to do. Yet, I believe that oaths can fulfill important 
functions once they are crafted as part of carefully designed, more 
comprehensive approaches to managing ethical culture. Or better, I believe 
that by investigating more closely what an oath really is and what its 
preconditions are, we may gain insights that will help to change corporate 
culture for the better, even if companies do not wish to adopt oaths to 
manage ethics. 
Methodologically, this Article is grounded in various strands of 
philosophical research. In particular, I build on work from political 
philosophy on the value of freedom, and on work from epistemology (the 
philosophical theory of knowledge) on the value of knowledge and 
common knowledge (which borrows from economics to some extent). I 
strive to keep technicalities to a minimum to make my argument accessible 
to a wide range of interested readers and to highlight the main idea of this 
Article. However, a disclaimer must be made that philosophy is a 
conceptual rather than an empirical discipline, and as a result it has its own 
style of researching and writing that distinguishes it, sometimes starkly, 
from social science and legal scholarship. 
The starting point of this investigation is that for a business to thrive, 
it needs freedom. Laws curtail an enterprise’s freedom in the sense that 
they make certain courses of action highly unattractive. Laws make certain 
actions costly through punishments, fines, and other credible threats, 
provided the laws are sufficiently strictly enforced. Ethical climate and 
culture, personal integrity, moral values, and corporate virtues, by 
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contrast, are meant to steer people towards ethical choices without limiting 
freedom. Naturally, approaches based in ethics are less immediately 
forceful instruments to influence behavior than the interventionist 
approach of changing behavior by means of laws and fines. Yet, it is also 
true that we cannot do without them. One cannot legislate everything 
away, even if one were to adopt entirely dictatorial management styles. 
That is, there is a sense in which the freedom to act unethically is an 
essential given we have to accept and perhaps even embrace. This 
underscores why ethical corporate culture is so important. 
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows. I first consider 
two arguments for the value of freedom and show that they only work if 
particular epistemic assumptions are made, that is, assumptions about the 
knowledge that agents have about their freedom (opportunity sets, likely 
consequences of available actions) and about the demands of morality. 
Next, I will examine what makes knowledge more valuable than mere true 
belief (knowledge offers stability that belief generally lacks). This stability 
is one reason why knowledge of freedom and knowledge about morality 
are important epistemic preconditions of corporate culture. Subsequently, 
this Article will consider “common” knowledge, which is a social concept 
focused on an individual’s knowledge about other people’s knowledge. By 
investigating “speech acts,” such as promising, I show that a second 
precondition of good corporate culture is common knowledge of norms 
and values. As a case study, I consider professional oaths, as they stand 
out as mechanisms generating common knowledge. I conclude by 
discussing a number of potential managerial implications. 
I. FREEDOM 
What is freedom? Opinions diverge, ranging from a conception of 
freedom as the absence of interference or the absence of illicit domination, 
over a definition of freedom in terms of the mere existence of opportunities 
or options, to conceptions holding on to the view that a person’s freedom 
is primarily determined by the extent to which he or she is able to realize 
an authentic self. Such conceptions have variably been called “negative 
freedom” (absence of interference), “republican freedom” (absence of 
domination), “positive freedom” (self-realization), or the standard 
economic conception of freedom in terms of “opportunity sets.”18 What is 
stated in this Article applies generally to all conceptions of freedom. For 
expository purposes, however, the economist’s conception of freedom is 
best suited. Therefore, this Article assumes that the extent of one’s 
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freedom is measured by the number of actions in one’s opportunity set, 
and ignores charges about measurability or conceptual cogency or 
“economism.”19 
The value of freedom can be easily explained using standard 
economics vocabulary. An economic agent is characterized along two 
dimensions. The first dimension is the agent’s beliefs about what the world 
actually looks like. More specifically, the first dimension is about the 
actions the agent can select as well as likely consequences of these 
actions—i.e., beliefs about the agent’s opportunity set. These beliefs may 
be incorrect or incomplete and based on good or bad evidence. Stated 
another way, the world may be very different from what the agent believes 
it to be. The second dimension is the agent’s desires, that is, preferences 
about what the world should look like from the agent’s point of view. More 
precisely, it is an ordering of all possible states of the world. The ordering 
of the possibilities is done by assigning a numerical value to all possible 
states of the world in a way that satisfies certain standard (but not 
unequivocally accepted) axioms.20 
Ideally, the agent would ensure that the best ranked world occurs. 
This is not always feasible, however. The best world may not be a world 
that is possible as one of the consequences to any of the agent’s available 
actions. No action from the agent’s opportunity set will in that case lead 
to the best world. It may also be among the potential consequences of one 
or more available actions, but only arise with probability less than one. 
The best world is where I win €1 million. But the only action that might 
make this probable is buying a lottery ticket. This action only minimally 
raises the probability of success. 
What a rational economic agent does is therefore not so much to 
maximize the probability that the best possible outcome arises—because 
that might involve buying as many lottery tickets as I can afford. Rather, 
a rational agent maximizes expected utility, where the utility of each 
potential consequence of an action is weighted by the subjective 
probability the agent assigns to it. 
If this is the way that we consider an economic agent’s decision 
situation, then it is easy to see that increasing freedom increases expected 
utility (or to be more precise, it does not decrease, and potentially increases 
it). Here is why: If one adds an action to an opportunity set, then either 
among its potential consequences there is one that the agent prefers over 
everything that he or she was so far capable of accomplishing, and, in that 
case, there has been a strict increase in expected utility; or the action 
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delivers consequences that are just as good—or worse—than what the 
agent can already accomplish with the actions in the original opportunity 
set. But then the added action does not decrease expected utility. 
Increasing freedom, then, increases an agent’s desire satisfaction. 
Consequently, to the extent that we value desire satisfaction, we have 
reason to value freedom.21 Call this argument for the value of freedom the 
argument from desire satisfaction. 
Reducing the value of freedom to the value of desire satisfaction, the 
argument from desire satisfaction does not show that freedom is 
intrinsically valuable, or valuable per se. It only shows that freedom is 
instrumentally valuable, namely, to the extent that it fosters desire 
satisfaction. Although there is considerable disagreement among 
philosophers about whether this is the only argument for freedom’s value 
(or whether it is even a good argument), and alternatives have suggested 
that the value of freedom is based in such things as moral responsibility, 
autonomy, authenticity, or in John Stuart Mill’s famous “experiments of 
living,”22 there is no need to decide here. What is important is to show that, 
as it stands, we can improve the argument by taking an epistemic (i.e., 
informational) perspective on human decision-making. 
What is the issue? Start with the agent’s beliefs again. Since beliefs 
are not necessarily true and complete, there may be considerable mismatch 
between what agents believe about their opportunity sets and what these 
sets look like in reality. For example, you may believe you can take the 
train to London St. Pancras, but if you are unaware of a strike or an 
accident that bars the trains from arriving in London, this belief will not 
contribute to satisfying your desire to reach London. This obstacle may 
even frustrate the realization of that desire because you may be motivated 
to forego the opportunity to get a car lift from a friend. As a result, in order 
for freedom to contribute to desire satisfaction, we need to have correct 
beliefs about our opportunity set, that is, about the available actions and 
the probabilities with which their consequences arise. 
While theoretically this observation is not very surprising, it has high 
practical relevance. There is a lot we lack knowledge about, sometimes 
with minor consequences for our desire satisfaction, but sometimes 
significantly affecting it. Just to illustrate, research demonstrates that a 
significant number of people fail to claim social security benefits they are 
entitled to, such as housing and school subsidies, because they are unaware 
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of them.23 If you forego €300 a month in housing subsidies, you cannot 
use them for something else, say, piano lessons or a vacation. As a result, 
your opportunity set is smaller than it would have been had you claimed 
the subsidy. More precisely, your opportunity set is larger than you think 
it is. 
If we accept this line of reasoning, it is easy to see that the argument 
from desire satisfaction is not so much an argument for freedom, but rather 
an argument for freedom you are aware of. It is an argument for fostering 
freedom and freedom-with-knowledge. It is an argument that sometimes 
making a person’s opportunity set bigger is not as effective in raising 
desire satisfaction as extending that person’s knowledge about his or her 
opportunity set. Mandatory education, governmental information 
campaigns, the obligation to inform one’s customers about the 
characteristics of one’s products or services, and informed consent 
requirements in health care—these are only a few examples of how 
freedom-with-knowledge can be realized in practice. This is underscored, 
for instance, by recent research showing that information campaigns 
concerning social benefit programs do indeed increase take-up.24 
The ethical relevance of the argument from desire satisfaction is 
straightforward: To the extent that your preferences reflect a commitment 
to morality, extending your opportunity set leads to better ethical 
outcomes. It boosts your moral desire satisfaction, so to speak. But we are 
not all saints. Freedom also increases when unethical actions are added to 
one’s opportunity set. Would it be valuable not to add such actions—or 
even to remove unethical options? Sometimes it is better to remove 
unethical options, and a host of compliance rules and procedures do 
exactly this. Actions can be literally made impossible or punishment can 
be added. In both cases, the opportunity set changes: either the 
performance of the unethical action is no longer possible or performing it 
without suffering punishment is no longer possible. 
Yet eliminating unethical options comes at a cost that is best 
explained by turning to a second argument for freedom’s value called the 
argument from moral responsibility.25 It has the exact same logical form 
as the argument from desire satisfaction, except “moral responsibility” is 
substituted for “desire satisfaction.” The idea behind this argument is that 
increasing the size of a person’s opportunity set increases the extent to 
which he or she exercises moral responsibility. The standard example, 
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credited to the philosopher Thomas Hurka, compares two people who have 
both chosen to pursue a career in teaching.26 Yet, their opportunity sets are 
not the same. The first person has the possibility of choosing a career in 
ten available careers; the second, only in teaching.27 The idea is that the 
first person, not the second, is responsible for not having chosen a career 
in any of the other possibilities.28 By choosing teaching, she excluded, for 
example, law and medicine (unlike the second person).29 This shows that 
adding options to an opportunity set increases your responsibility in the 
sense that it makes the set of outcomes you exclude larger. 
The observation summarized in the previous sentence has clear 
ethical relevance. In the absence of any tempting unethical alternatives, it 
makes little sense to praise someone for acting ethically; there was no 
benefit for acting unethically. People are only praised for acting ethically 
if they could have acted unethically; more precisely, people are only 
praised for acting ethically if they knew that they could have acted 
unethically, and even more so if there is temptation to do so. 
Now if this sounds like a platitude, it is important to underscore why 
the practice of praising and blaming people appropriately is key to ethical 
culture. In the philosophical literature, two positions about the value of 
praise and blame can be distinguished.30 A “merit-based” view contends 
that there is a certain intrinsic value in praising a person that deserves 
praise (and conversely, in blaming a person that deserves blame).31 A 
“consequentialist” position focuses on the potential consequences of there 
being a practice in place of praising and blaming.32 For example, the merit-
based view may explain why we praise athletes for their accomplishments. 
We do not award gold medals because we expect this to create an incentive 
for people to perform maximally in, say, a marathon, as there is generally 
nothing valuable instrumentally in people running long distances quickly. 
The consequentialist position may be more attractive than the merit-based 
view when it comes to ethical action. This idea is based on the fact that 
praise and blame are types of feedback regarding people’s decisions that 
reinforce desirable actions and change undesirable actions. While people 
may respond quite differently to praise and blame in different contexts, it 
is undeniably the case that in a well-functioning corporate culture 
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employees obtain continuous feedback on what they do.33 As a result, the 
argument from moral responsibility teaches us that if the space for failure 
is limited, in the sense that the opportunity set is small, the space for 
genuine feedback is also limited. As every educator knows, learning 
involves failure, and to fail, one needs the opportunity to fail. A bad parent 
is one who removes any possibility of their child failing, and thus, any 
opportunity for learning from his or her failures. 
If feedback works well, people gain ethical knowledge. Human 
beings may be born with certain innate ethical norms and values; however, 
moral education plays a crucial role in growing up to be a virtuous adult 
human being.34 A tradition in philosophy and moral psychology going 
back at least as far as Aristotle states that virtue requires constant learning, 
constant maintenance, and constant feedback.35 We learn in new 
situations, and we practice virtue in common situations. We learn from 
role models, and we hope to be examples for others. We reflect, analyze, 
debate, deliberate, judge, intend, act, succeed or fail, and learn again. That 
is how we gain knowledge of the demands of morality. The argument from 
moral responsibility is essential to understanding how people learn. In 
summary, we need to know our opportunity set; however, we also need to 
know what consequences morality supports, as well as which 
consequences we should morally try to avoid. In economic parlance, we 
need to know what preference orderings are compatible with what 
morality demands, and which ones not. We need what I call knowledge 
about freedom and knowledge about morality. 
II. KNOWLEDGE 
An ethical culture endows people with knowledge about freedom and 
morality. In a sense, what it means for a culture to qualify as “ethical” is 
that its members possess such knowledge and act on it. Thinking about 
ethical culture may benefit from contemplating the difference between 
belief and knowledge, and that is what will be considered now. Beliefs, in 
the way philosophers use the term, may be false, they may be true by sheer 
luck (e.g., when a “wild guess” happens to be correct), and they may be 
true and based on evidence that justifies them (a reasoned and researched 
belief that is correct).36 Roughly, only the third kind of belief counts as 
knowledge. Accepting this distinction, an obvious philosophical question 
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is: it is natural to prefer mere true belief over false belief, but why would 
you prefer the third type, justified true belief, over mere true belief? Why 
would you want more than the truth? 
In a famous passage in the Meno, Plato considers the difference 
between knowledge and belief.37 He makes the familiar point that a belief 
may be true by luck. For example, if I make a wild guess about the number 
of participants in a seminar room and the guess turns out correct, it is 
incorrect to describe me as having possessed knowledge about the number 
of participants. In this example, the guess was just lucky, nothing more 
than that. Plato argues that in order for a true belief to be credited as 
genuine knowledge, the belief must be based on evidence that makes it 
justifiable for us to adopt the belief.38 In the example above, if I had 
counted the number of participants, or if the organizers of the seminar had 
informed me about the number of participants that they had counted, I 
would have had evidence for my belief, and so I would have been justified 
in holding that belief. 
It may be hard to see why it matters to human agency whether a 
person has a belief that is merely true by luck or whether he or she 
possesses knowledge. Whether my belief about freedom and morality is 
true by luck or evidence, I will perform the action that maximizes expected 
utility, where my utility function conforms to what I believe (or know) to 
be moral. In either case, I have the same expectations. I will select the 
same action, irrespective of whether I have mere true belief or genuine 
knowledge about freedom and morality. 
Philosophers, however, tend to disagree with such a line of reasoning 
for the following reason.39 Imagine, as Plato does in the Meno, that you 
want to walk to the city of Larisa. In one scenario, you know the way; in 
another, you only have a true belief about it. Suppose somewhere en route 
to Larisa, the road turns back for a fairly long time, in what may seem to 
you to be the wrong direction. Will you conclude that you have taken the 
wrong way? In the scenario in which you possess a mere true belief about 
the route to Larisa, based on a wild guess, you may indeed conclude that 
your wild guess was wrong. You may return and fail to reach Larisa. In 
the scenario where you possess knowledge about the way to Larisa, 
however, you have evidence that justifies your belief about the way to 
Larisa. Someone may have told you that this is the right way to Larisa, you 
may have checked a map, or you may have walked the road before. While 
you see that the road is indeed going in the wrong direction, you will not 
                                                     
 37. W. R. M. LAMB, PLATO: LACHES, PROTAGORAS, MENO, EUTHYDEMUS 97A–98A (1924). 
 38. Id. 
 39. See generally PRITCHARD, supra note 33. 
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conclude that you have to return. You will keep on walking because you 
know you will reach Larisa if you do so, and so you reach Larisa. 
Plato describes the difference between mere true belief and 
knowledge as follows: knowledge is more stable than mere true belief 
because, unlike a wild guess, it is “fastened” to the evidence.40 It is this 
stability—of knowledge being tied to the truth—that makes knowledge 
preferable over belief, not only from a purely epistemological point of 
view but also instrumentally in the sense that it makes it more likely that 
we reach our goals. 
I believe that the distinction between belief and knowledge—
theoretical as it may appear—has crucial relevance to corporate ethical 
culture. Those of us who have consulted with businesses on ethics 
management have certainly met employees—or perhaps even compliance 
officers—who are unable to explain the rationale underlying laws, rules, 
principles, or norms, even though they are aware of them, and act on them. 
This may concern apparently small things (why should I state my 
affiliations on this particular disclosure form?). It may concern general 
principles that a firm espouses (why is it that we do not invest in nuclear 
power?). Or it may concern a firm’s mission (why is it that our mission is 
to “empower” customers to “stay a step ahead in life and in business,” as 
the Dutch ING Group has?).41 Following the above logic, when some 
individual cannot answer such questions, his or her knowledge about 
corporate values must be diagnosed as insufficiently stable. If the 
individual knows the rule, but not the rationale behind the rule, he or she 
will likely not know how to act in the spirit of the rule in a case where 
applying the rule is less than straightforward. The individual may be 
unable to articulate new rules for new cases and less successful in 
motivating newcomers to follow the rule. If the individual sees the rule in 
isolation, and not as an element of a larger corporate culture and as norms 
that govern corporate behavior, the individual will essentially fail to see 
the values underlying it and the culture stimulating it. 
This is not meant to be pedantic or “intellectualist.” Quite to the 
contrary, knowledge is a very wide concept that includes things that go far 
beyond the encyclopedia or the rules book. It includes implicit and tacit 
understanding, imaginative wisdom, practical communicative and 
empathic skills, and business experience; because all these things, and 
many others, provide people with insights, evidence, and justification that 
allows them to see more broadly what acting with integrity means. 
                                                     
 40. LAMB, supra note 37, at 98a. 
 41. Purpose & Strategy, ING, https://www.ing.com/About-us/Profile/Purpose-strategy.htm 
[https://perma.cc/S6H5-635Z]. 
2020] Epistemic Corporate Culture 819 
It is common in business ethics to distinguish between principle-
based and rule-based approaches to changing corporate culture.42 The 
implicit suggestion here is that a principle-based approach is often 
preferable because it leads exactly to what I have described here as 
valuable: understanding, knowledge, and justification.43 From a 
philosophical point of view, however, this can only be part of the story: 
both approaches will fail in creating a stable corporate culture as long as 
they generate mere true beliefs rather than genuine knowledge. Principles 
without knowledge are just as empty as rules without knowledge. 
Before taking the next step from individual knowledge to social, 
common knowledge, let me take stock. I started with a solemn, public 
ceremony during which a group of prominent financials pledged an oath, 
and I took this as inspiration to investigate ethical climate and culture in 
organizations. I then introduced a key theoretical starting point of the 
investigation to the effect that ethics—ethical action—presupposes 
freedom, not only in the sense that freedom provides you with the 
opportunities for ethical action but also with opportunities to assume moral 
responsibility for deciding against unethical actions. I briefly noted the 
relevance of this to fostering ethical culture in organizations through 
feedback: People praise and blame each other for things they do, but this 
cannot be done effectively without knowledge about freedom. I 
subsequently considered the difference between belief and knowledge and 
showed that because knowledge requires evidence and justification, it is 
more stable than belief: It is less easily lost when one is confronted with 
what looks like counter-evidence. Finally, I assessed the value of 
possessing knowledge about corporate rules and principles and showed 
why such knowledge is important to corporate culture. In sum, I argued 
that an ethical corporate culture entails knowledge about freedom and 
morality. 
III. COMMON KNOWLEDGE 
While knowledge about freedom and morality is necessary, we need 
more for corporate culture to flourish. We need what philosophers and 
economists call “common knowledge.”44 That is the purpose of the current 
section. So far, I have discussed knowledge possessed by individuals. 
Common knowledge, however, is a social concept that describes 
                                                     
 42. See generally Surendra Arjoon, Striking a Balance Between Rules and Principles-Based 
Approaches for Effective Governance: A Risks-Based Approach, 68 J. BUS. ETHICS 53 (2006). 
 43. See generally Edwin M. Hartman, Reconciliation in Business Ethics: Some Advice from 
Aristotle, 18 BUS. ETHICS Q. 253 (2008). 
 44. See generally BOUDEWIJN DE BRUIN, EXPLAINING GAMES: THE EPISTEMIC PROGRAMME IN 
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someone’s knowledge about another person’s knowledge. It brings 
additional benefits to corporate culture. 
To introduce the notion of common knowledge, imagine a team of 
workers meeting in a conference room with a traditional roundtable 
setting. The chairperson makes an announcement that the CEO of the 
company has decided to step down. Everyone in the room hears it, so 
everyone now knows that the CEO has decided to step down. Equally, 
everyone knows that everyone else has heard the announcement, so 
everyone knows that everyone knows the CEO is about to step down. The 
preceding realization has material consequences. For instance, suppose 
that after the meeting, one team member asks another, “Did you expect her 
to step down?” Then the addressee of the question immediately 
understands what her interlocutor is referring to, and moreover, the 
interlocutor can assume that when she asks precisely this question, the 
addressee understands what she refers to. 
We call the sort of knowledge that arises after a public announcement 
of the kind above “common knowledge.”45 Formally, it may be thought of 
as an infinite conjunction of increasingly complex propositions obtained 
by sequentially adding “everyone knows” to the previous proposition, 
even if economists and logicians have developed intricate ways that do not 
require the use of potentially mysterious infinite constructs.46 The example 
illustrates that common knowledge facilitates communication: for a 
speaker to use a particular term successfully in communication with a 
particular hearer, there has to be common knowledge among them about 
the meaning of the term. If I consider it possible that you will interpret my 
use of the word “library” as referring to a bookshop (for instance, because 
I think you, a French speaker beginning to speak English, may be 
misguided by the French librairie, “bookshop”), it is irrational for me to 
use “library” if I want to talk about a library with you. 
It is helpful to distinguish a number of functions that common 
knowledge may fulfill. A standard example in economics concerns 
common knowledge in a situation where two agents are engaged in 
strategic interaction, or in economic parlance: a normal form game.47 The 
concept of opportunity can be used as a way to characterize such 
                                                     
 45. See Morris F. Friedell, On the Structure of Shared Awareness, 14 BEHAV. SCI. 19–20 (1969). 
See generally Jane Heal, Common Knowledge, 28 PHIL. Q. 116 (1978); Peter Vanderschraaf, Common 
Knowledge, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Aug. 18, 2001), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/common-
knowledge/ [https://perma.cc/N3GR-QSDE].  
 46. See, e.g., Jon Barwise, Three Views of Common Knowledge, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
SECOND CONFERENCE ON THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF REASONING ABOUT KNOWLEDGE 365–79 
(Moshe Y. Vardi ed., 1988). 
 47. See generally Adam Brandenburger, Knowledge and Equilibrium in Games, 6 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 83 (1992). 
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situations. What has to be included in the model is the fact that the 
consequences of the actions that are available to me depend on what 
actions you choose. That is why we actually include two opportunity sets, 
with a range of outcomes over which we both have preferences, and where 
these preferences do not always coincide. See the example here below. 
 
  Agent T 
  K L M 
 A 0,3 3,2 3,1
Agent S B 1,3 2,2 2,1
 C 0,0 1,1 1,0
 
Agent S can select actions A, B, or C. Agent T has K, L, and M in 
the opportunity set. If S selects A, and T selects K, they arrive at a situation 
that is most preferred for T (who gets three units of utility) and least 
preferred for S (who gets zero units of utility). 
What will the players do? Each will try to reason about what their 
opponent will do. T may reason that S will not select C because whatever 
action T selects, S will earn one unit of utility more by selecting B rather 
than C. So, T will focus on what is best given that S selects A or B. The 
result of this is that T will now be able to reason that K is optimal because 
if S plays A or B, selecting K ensures three units of utility for T as opposed 
to L (only two units) and M (only one unit). 
Suppose that S knows that T knows what S’s preferences are. Then 
this means that S knows that T will choose a best response to A and B only 
and that T will reason that K is optimal. S can now reason further and 
determine the best course of action: select B, which is going to yield one 
unit of utility, as opposed to zero units that playing A or C would yield. 
As a result, in the end the outcome is that S selects B, and T selects K. 
The details of this line of reasoning are unimportant. The key 
observation is that this kind of reasoning does not come off the ground if 
the two agents lack common knowledge of the structure of the game 
(“common knowledge of utility,” and of each other’s maximizing 
expected utility, that is, “common knowledge of rationality”). It has to be 
common knowledge. It is insufficient that I only know your preferences, 
because if I think that you believe that I may not know your preferences, 
then I will not be able to internalize your reasoning about me—that is, to 
think about your predictions of my behavior. And predicting the 
opponent’s behavior is exactly what happens here. It is a kind of higher-
order reasoning where we put ourselves in the position of others reasoning 
about us. This is a cognitively demanding task. There is evidence that only 
cognitively advanced mammals are able to engage in this type of 
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reasoning, while human babies cannot do it.48 And as the example shows, 
common knowledge of utility and rationality is what generates these 
beliefs. 
This example is drawn from economics. It is formal and neat, but it 
is also perhaps a bit stilted and unrealistic. However, this should not 
detract from the fact that common knowledge is of enormous business 
importance. A concrete example studied in economics is the Super Bowl, 
which attracts the largest number of television viewers every year in the 
U.S.49 The question: Why do companies pay enormous amounts of money 
to buy only a minute of time to advertise around the event? Is this an 
innocuous, or even silly, question? At first sight, perhaps it is: Typically, 
a marketing campaign is more effective if more people see it. 
But as some economists have argued,50 the Super Bowl offers a 
second attraction to marketers that warrants paying significantly more than 
could be explained only on the basis of the sheer number of viewers: it is 
the American instrument par excellence to create common knowledge. 
You not only know that many people watch it, but you also know that 
many people know that many people watch it, and so on. How could that 
be relevant? A famous example is a campaign launched in the 1984 Super 
Bowl by Apple Computer.51 Apple introduced an entirely new computer 
called the “Macintosh” (Mac). It was patently clear that the Mac would 
not be compatible with the then-prominent personal computer (PC), which 
was working with MS-DOS. Software developed for the PC would clearly 
be useless for the Mac. As a result, it was also clear that buying a Mac 
would only satisfy your desires if sufficiently many others did so as well, 
because only then software companies would have an incentive to develop 
software for the Mac. There will always be early adopters (“lighthouse 
customers”) who do not care much about such things. They are willing to 
take the risk, or they just want to be the first to buy a new gadget. However, 
the majority of consumers want to wait until they see that the technology 
is sufficiently widely adopted. It is this process that airing an ad during the 
Super Bowl speeds up, and the mechanism is that it creates common 
knowledge. Consumers who are slower to adopt know that a significant 
number of gadget-happy early adopters will buy the computer merely on 
the basis of having watched the ad, and this may give more cautious, 
slower adopters the confidence needed to buy the computer themselves. 
                                                     
 48. See generally Sylvain Sirois & Iain Jackson, Social Cognition in Infancy: A Critical Review 
of Research on Higher Order Abilities, 4 EUR. J. DEV. PSYCHOL. 46 (2007). 
 49. MICHAEL SUK-YOUNG CHWE, RATIONAL RITUAL: CULTURE, COORDINATION, AND 
COMMON KNOWLEDGE, 45–49 (2001). 
 50. See id. at 45. 
 51. Id. at 86. 
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Playing a strategic game or deciding whether to buy a Macintosh are 
essentially individual activities, despite the fact that the outcome of one 
agent’s actions depends on what others do. But common knowledge is also 
essential when we perform actions together. Turning to this topic brings 
us closer to the main motivation that underlies this discussion of common 
knowledge: ethical climate and culture. A simple example first: two people 
going to the opera together. How do they do that? Sue wants to go to the 
opera with Tanya, and Tanya wants to go to the opera with Sue. Sue does 
not want to go to the opera if Tanya does not go, and Tanya does not want 
to go if Sue does not go. Suppose they have not communicated about the 
opera. Will they go? Surely not. So, what should they communicate? Sue 
cannot truthfully say, “I am going to the opera, and it would be lovely if 
you joined me,” because she is not unconditionally going to the opera. 
Would it help if she said, “I am going to the opera if you go to the opera”? 
Not quite, because in order for this to work, Tanya would have to respond 
by saying something like, “I am going to the opera,” but that would not be 
quite right, because Tanya is not unconditionally going to the opera either; 
she is only going to the opera if Sue is going to the opera too. 
An artificial problem? Not at all! Two armies jointly attacking the 
enemy, two soccer players coordinating with one assisting the other to 
score a goal, two people about to jump into rough waters to rescue a 
drowning adult—making the start as an army, a player, or the first person 
jumping into the water, carries a significant risk: The others might not join 
you. So how are you going to ensure that they do join? The answer is to 
create common knowledge of sorts. The mechanism is not complex—if it 
were, joint action would be rare. If there is common knowledge of “joint 
readiness”52 among Sue and Tanya, the army, the soccer player, or the 
rescuers, then it can be assured that the other will join. So how do Sue and 
Tanya create common knowledge of joint readiness? Sue might ask Tanya: 
“What about going to the opera tonight?” If Tanya answers: “Yes, let us 
go,” then joint readiness has been made common knowledge. They will 
go. 
Now consider promising. Often—but not always—a promise is a 
promise to someone about something that concerns that someone. 
Following a tradition of philosophical and linguistic inquiry that goes back 
to the British philosopher John Austin,53 promising is a “speech act”: the 
mere uttering of the words “I promise” creates an obligation for the 
promisor towards the promisee or promisees. Promising, then, is not just 
speech—it is also an action. Saying “I do” during a wedding ceremony (at 
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the right point in time and by the right person) is another example of a 
speech act. The core idea is that speech acts do not intend to describe the 
world, but rather change the world. 
I promise to you that I will bring back the book tomorrow, or I 
promise to you that I will repair your car. Sometimes a promise is about 
something that does not directly concern the person to whom the promise 
is made. I promise to my boss that I will take good care of our customer’s 
car. But that is often at least also a promise to my boss; the customer has 
entrusted her car to my boss, and my boss entrusts the car to me to be 
mended, and I promise that I will take good care of it. 
It is typically hard to promise something to someone if that someone 
is absent, or if that someone could not sufficiently easily find out about the 
promise. How could I promise that I will take good care of your car if you 
are not there when I make the promise? A private promise is not very 
useful. I can surely make a firm commitment to myself that I am going to 
take good care of your car. That is far from ethically insignificant, of 
course. Yet, the reason why a private promise is largely lacking sense is 
that it is part of the logic of a promise that it makes something common 
knowledge among the promisor and promisee. A promise has to be heard 
by the promise, that is, it has to be received, it has to be acknowledged, 
and this has to be common knowledge between the promisor and promisee. 
If I promise to you that I will take good care of your car, then the result is 
that you know that I have promised to do so, and I know that you know 
that, and so on. A result of this type of acknowledgment is that my 
commitment to take good care of your car becomes stronger. If I only 
privately commit myself to do something, I know that as soon as I do not 
do it, no one will notice the discrepancy between the earlier commitment 
and my current decision not to carry out the action. If, by contrast, I have 
promised to repair your car, and then I do not do it, it is clear to you that I 
broke my promise—and it is clear to me that this will be clear to you. 
Promising creates expectations in the promisee because it generates a 
publicly acknowledged commitment. These expectations add additional 
force to the promisor’s commitment. 
It is important to see where that extra force comes from. One might 
think that a promise creates an extra obligation over and above the 
obligations that a private commitment might generate. That is not 
necessarily true. There are innumerable obligations we have vis-à-vis 
other people that have never been made the explicit topic of a promise. I 
have never promised anyone to drive carefully, for instance, but I could do 
that. This would not create an additional obligation, though. This applies, 
for instance, to cases where people promise to follow the law—or swear 
an oath containing a statement to that effect. This is not to say that 
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promises may not create obligations; but to the extent that they create 
obligations, they create obligations that without the promise would not be 
there. If I promise to repair your car or take good care of your dog, I create 
a new obligation. 
Yet, whether or not a promise reiterates an existing obligation or 
creates a new one, it strengthens the expectations that the promisee will 
have vis-à-vis the promisor. The promisee knows that the promisor will 
expect the promisee to feel let down if the promisor reneged on the 
promise and that the promisor cannot, for instance, find an excuse on the 
grounds that the promisor was unaware of the obligation: for the promisee 
knows that the promisor knows that the promisee was present when the 
promisor made the promise. The effect of the public character of the 
promise is, therefore, perhaps more psychological than moral. That 
common knowledge of the promise is established creates additional 
reasons for the promisor not to disappoint the expectations of the 
promisee. 
IV. PROFESSIONAL OATHS 
A. Characteristics 
The typical professional oath is a promise, with the profession’s 
beneficiaries serving as the promisees (or sometimes also society at 
large).54 Oaths typically satisfy a number of conditions, the effect of which 
is to generate high-quality common knowledge,55 or so I argue. To begin 
with, oaths have a highly public character. The example with which I 
started this Article offers the case in point: a ceremony, in a central and 
well-known church in The Netherlands, with many people attending, 
covered by national television and other media. The publicity of an oath 
also comes to the fore in the way that individual oath-taking is 
documented. The MBA Oath, for instance, while there is no standard 
ceremony involved, has a high degree of publicity because all signatories 
are listed online. Moreover, even though an oath-taking ceremony is not 
public in the medical profession, the way this profession is set up in 
countries such as The Netherlands and France makes sure that (interested) 
patients know that every medical practitioner has pledged (a version of) 
the Hippocratic Oath.56 The ceremonial aspect of oath-taking reinforces 
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this point. An oath sworn during a ceremony is less easily forgotten than 
an oath sworn in between two business meetings, and the ceremonial 
gestures that often accompany oath-taking reinforce recall. An oath-taking 
ceremony has to be a unique and memorable event. Some business schools 
have, therefore, organized ceremonies for graduates to pledge the MBA 
Oath.57 These oath-taking ceremonies are common knowledge generators 
just like the Super Bowl or the round table announcement about the CEO’s 
decision to step down. 
We should expect the content of an oath to be a general commitment. 
It would be ineffective to swear an oath every time you promised. There 
would be too many oaths to make a lasting impression. I promise to take 
good care of your dog, but I swear that I will never harm anyone, as the 
original Hippocratic Oath has it. A result of this generality is that breaking 
an oath will negatively affect the promisor’s moral standing as a whole 
person, rather than as, say, a good dog-sitter. It affects the oath-taker’s 
integrity, a concept that is a key element of business ethics management, 
capturing the sense of people having themselves together.58 Swearing the 
MBA Oath, for instance, commits one to ensuring that one’s “personal 
behavior will be an example of integrity, consistent with the values that 
[one] publicly espouse[s].”59 To the extent that people wish to maintain a 
positive view of their own moral standing, an oath provides them with a 
higher degree of moral motivation than a promise. Moreover, it seems 
plausible to say that the negative effects of breaking a promise concern the 
promisor’s trustworthiness in the first place vis-à-vis the type of actions 
the promise is about (dog-sitting, say). Breaking a dog-sitting promise is 
less likely to affect the promisee’s perception of the promisor’s overall 
trustworthiness–and even less, his or her overall integrity. We are used to 
assigning different degrees of trust to promises about actions in different 
domains, made by one and the same promisor, based on what we have 
come to learn about the promisor’s trustworthiness in these domains. But 
while such distinctions make sense for trust and assignments of 
trustworthiness, they do not make good sense for evaluations of a person’s 
moral standing. 
The above is underscored by the fact that we tend to find that 
breaking a promise may become excusable (or even normatively expected) 
when relevant events intervene. If I have promised my daughter to pick up 
her bicycle on the way home, but just when I wanted to leave a colleague 
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stopped by my office to tell me about a serious incident with a student, I 
may be excused (and perhaps even required) to break that promise, 
irrespective of whether my daughter will accept my reasons. The promise 
to pick up the bike was little more than an expression of an intention. I 
said, “I promise,” but if I had said “I will,” “I plan,” or “I intend,” I would 
almost have said the same thing. Oaths, by contrast, are not expressions of 
intentions or plans. Breaking them surely decreases trust. Yet the more 
pronounced effects concern one’s general moral standing. 
The fact that the commitment made through an oath in general does 
not mean that a good professional oath should not be very concrete and 
explicit about who its intended beneficiaries are. This goes often hand-in-
hand with stating, as part of the oath, what the function is that the oath-
taker fulfills socially as a professional. The Hippocratic Oath, for instance, 
stresses the admittedly unsurprising fact that the primary concern of the 
medical profession is the health of patients.60 Oaths that insufficiently 
describe beneficiaries clearly risk losing binding force. If it is unclear who 
is the intended beneficiary—the promisee—one may legitimately expect 
oath-takers to exploit the vagueness in the definition of the beneficiaries 
to exculpate themselves in particular cases and to deny that people raising 
complaints against them are in fact among the intended beneficiaries of 
the oath. 
This may sound slightly theoretical, so let me illustrate. The MBA 
Oath mentions a whole array of beneficiaries, including shareholders, 
employees, consumers, civil society, government, and the natural 
environment.61 It excludes, however, suppliers and competitors. These 
stakeholders are indeed easily forgotten.62 Yet law and business ethics 
contain numerous provisions protecting them,63 and no manager taking an 
MBA Oath should assume that suppliers and competitors can be ignored 
or that their concerns are less important than the stakeholders explicitly 
mentioned in the oath. 
I turn now to two more contentious elements of oaths: a stipulation 
of the consequences of oath-breaking and an invocation of a transcendent 
entity. Oaths no longer contain such phrases as, “May I suffer a painful 
and ignominious death if I fail to carry out my solemn oath to defend the 
honor of the King,”64 and for good reasons. Francis Hutcheson’s definition 
of an oath as a “religious act in which for confirmation of something 
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doubtful, we invoke God as witness and avenger . . . ” no longer applies 
either.65 To some extent, however, one must wonder if a twenty-first-
century update of these two elements—a description of a sanction on oath-
breaking and a reference to a transcendent entity—might be preferable. 
The goal of the first type of phrase is to stipulate what happens if the oath 
is broken. Generally, professional oaths are part of larger systems of laws 
and internal rules that do in fact stipulate sanctions on transgressions.66 
However, it may add to the strength of an oath if the repercussions of 
breaking an oath are made common knowledge among promisor and 
promisee, that is, between professionals and society at large. Oath-takers 
may then know that society expects them, for instance, to confront a 
disciplinary council in the case of oath-breaking and that it will be a matter 
of public scrutiny whether these disciplinary councils fulfill their tasks 
with sufficient energy and vigor. Another reason why it may be good to 
create common knowledge and inform society about the sanctions and 
repercussions that oath-breakers face is that this allows society to judge 
the effectivity of the incentives thus created. If oath-breaking leads to 
expulsion from the profession no matter what, this certainly does more to 
boost compliance than if oath-breakers have to suspend their activities 
only for a month or so. 
Considering the difference between oaths and promises offers 
another perspective on sanctions and repercussions. Since oaths involve 
the person’s integrity, that is, his or her moral standing as a person as a 
whole, repercussions of oath-breaking can be more general in the sense of 
being less dependent on the precise way in which the oath was broken. 
Without implying a judgment about merits, it is worth pointing out that in 
the wake of the global financial crisis, several countries have started 
examining the possibility of introducing jail sentences for high-level 
finance professionals, even though so far only one person has been put 
behind bars.67 Whether including the threat of jail—or perhaps more 
realistically “dismissal with disgrace” —in an oath would be a good idea 
is, however, something that should be further examined. 
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The Dutch Bankers Oath ends with one of two sentences: “So help 
me God!” or “This I pledge and promise!”68 The choice is up to the oath-
taker. Traditionally, most oaths have referred to something transcendental, 
such as a religious deity or other objects or concepts held in high regard, 
such as a religious text or constitution.69 In a religious context, this created 
an additional witness to the oath-taking, or in terms of the model that I am 
proposing here, it made God a participant in common knowledge. If 
God—or any transcendent entity held in high regard—knows that you 
have committed yourself to do something, this gives you an additional, 
religious reason to stick to it. In a more secular context, such arguments 
may become less persuasive. We will soon see, however, that some 
psychological research suggests that even non-religious people may 
undergo the additional motivating force of pledging by a transcendent 
entity.70 
B. Fostering Professionalism 
What function can professional oaths reasonably be expected to 
fulfill? One function is that they may foster professionalism. It has been 
observed that a solemn oath-taking ceremony is a kind of rite de passage 
concluding a professional’s formal training.71 This observation not only 
emphasizes the fact that members of a profession share a body of specific 
technical knowledge, expertise, and skills, but also calls attention to a set 
of norms and values that are specific to the profession.72 The oath brings 
out to the open that members of the profession can count upon each other 
to possess these skills and to subscribe to these norms and values. It is not 
so much that the oath here creates common knowledge among 
practitioners; formal professional training has already generated such 
common knowledge. The point is rather that the oath makes things salient 
to practitioners. Work in medical ethics shows that when the intended 
beneficiaries are aware of the oath, the oath creates reasons for 
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beneficiaries to trust and expect that professionals will conform to 
professional standards of expertise and integrity.73 
C. Facilitating Moral Deliberation 
Apart from fostering professionalism, oaths may also facilitate moral 
deliberation. Common knowledge plays a role again in this assertion. As 
research in medical ethics shows, the Hippocratic Oath functions as an 
instrument for moral analysis for individual medical practitioners and 
moral deliberation among colleagues.74 This function is underscored by 
the fact that doctors and medical ethicists use the Hippocratic Oath as a 
source of information and inspiration in debates about diverse topics such 
as euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide,75 health insurance reforms,76 
the role of physicians in professional sports,77 quality control in 
hospitals,78 and many others. 
The force of common knowledge becomes clear when one considers 
the way in which oaths stimulate moral deliberation among professionals. 
Common knowledge makes ethical reasons within the oath salient, which 
allows the debate to focus on particular aspects of the problem at hand. It 
creates, so to speak, a set of “default” moral reasons or considerations that 
must be addressed in any case. The consequence is not only that moral 
deliberation among professionals will typically center around the key 
values of the profession, but also that additional strong reasons must be 
provided in favor of the relevance of any argument that is not backed by 
the oath. The Hippocratic Oath, for instance, does not specify anything 
about cost efficiency: the health of the patient is the first and foremost 
concern. A result of this information gap is that the participants who 
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introduce financial considerations bear the burden of proof during any 
discussion about the costs of healthcare informed by the Hippocratic Oath. 
D. Enhancing Compliance 
For most beneficiaries, the most pressing issue in the end is whether 
the oath (or any other business ethics instrument) induces compliance. So 
far, I have stressed the relevance of two things: knowledge and common 
knowledge. We saw that promises generate common knowledge among 
the promisor and the promisee, and that this common knowledge increases 
the binding force of the commitment made through the promise because, 
among other things, it creates expectations in the promisee that the 
promisor is aware of. To the extent that oaths are promises, they generate 
common knowledge of this type. Clearly, however, the act of promising 
may be more or less successful in making normative expectations common 
knowledge. I may mumble words. You may not pay full attention. I may 
not be entirely sincere, or I may fail to see that you cannot hear my 
promise. These nuances would make for a more “secret” or “private” 
affair, which, as I argued, does not capture the central social sense of 
promising, as it fails to meet the requirement that a promise can be publicly 
acknowledged by the promisee. 
The idea now is that the above characteristics of the oath offer 
mechanisms to bring the commitment expressed in the oath into the open 
in a way that increases the chance of successfully establishing common 
knowledge. This goal is certainly no guarantee. Oaths may also misfire. 
But the solemn ceremonial character of oath-taking, the fact that it is 
public and open to witnesses—potentially strengthened by the invocation 
of transcendent entities—increases the likelihood that common knowledge 
is established and maintained. By pledging the oath, the oath-taker openly 
and publicly creates expectations among the beneficiaries, which form an 
additional reason to keep the commitments specified in the oath—
additional in the sense that the commitment itself specifies reasons, and 
the oath-taking creates extra reasons, as I argued above. It is quite 
reasonable to assume, as I did above, that people are generally interested 
in maintaining a view of themselves as individuals of sufficiently high 
moral standing; they are keen not only to view themselves as moral 
individuals, but also to be viewed by others as moral individuals. As a 
result, once a commitment becomes common knowledge, an extra reason 
exists to keep the commitment. Breaking the commitment not only 
decreases one’s own view of their moral standing, but also causes those 
who were aware of the commitment to make their own judgments about 
that person’s moral standing. 
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If this concept sounds a tad theoretical, think about how it may help 
us to keep some resolutions by making them common knowledge among 
family and friends. We want to save face, we want to show the strength of 
our commitment to our friends; we have, in a sense, partly externalized 
our internal motivation. We not only have an interest in keeping our 
commitment to go to the gym more often for our own benefit, but we are 
now also interested in keeping this commitment because we want to avoid 
appearing weak-willed in the eyes of friends and family. We may want to 
avoid their criticism or their sarcasm. It is an interesting question whether 
this phenomenon is to be analyzed as offering a truly external reason to 
perform a good action on par with offering financial incentives for acting 
with integrity, or whether this interest is still part of a larger set of internal 
motives. But that is an issue that I will sidestep here. 
There is some empirical evidence that oaths indeed accomplish what 
they are meant to, and some of the research points in a direction that 
confirms the mechanism I have postulated above.79 I should say, however, 
that the evidence is fairly scant, and that some evidence does counter the 
idea that oaths are effective as ways of managing ethics.80 There is also 
some evidence that sharing one’s intentions (as in the resolution example 
above) may not help to keep them.81 Clearly, much more empirical work 
is needed on this subject, and I only offer a conceptual argument here. I 
should perhaps repeat another disclaimer: oaths are a case study. My 
arguments are, I believe, easily generalized to other, perhaps more 
common, forms of ethics management using such things as stakeholder 
dialogue, ethics training, and codes of conduct. I also want to show in this 
Article that these other more common forms can benefit from considering 
the epistemic aspects of human decision-making: the value of knowledge 
about freedom and morality, and the value of common knowledge of 
commitments. 
Next, let me turn to some potentially relevant empirical work. Some 
research concerns virginity pledges, where oath-takers pledge not to 
engage in premarital sexual intercourse. These turn out to work best in a 
community of people that mutually reinforces compliance.82 Such a 
community may work because it monitors compliance, but it also 
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reinvigorates the public acknowledgement of the commitment. It keeps 
common knowledge alive. 
Dan Ariely recounted an oft-quoted case offering anecdotal evidence 
that transcendental references may be effective even in fairly secular 
environments.83 He described a Middle Tennessee State University 
professor who made students swear that they would not cheat, and if they 
did, “they ‘would be sorry for the rest of their lives and go to Hell . . . .’”84 
Ariely noted that despite the highly controversial approach taken by the 
professor, the oath as such may be successful, as it makes the oath-takers 
visualize the stakes as “very high,” even for those who “did not necessarily 
believe in Hell.”85 
Less anecdotal evidence exists to the effect that oaths make people 
more likely to tell the truth, even though some of that research only 
involves children.86 Moreover, apart from the above-mentioned virginity 
pledges, pledges to eat healthy food,87 not to smoke,88 or to reveal one’s 
actual preferences in a second bid auction89 seem to have at least some 
positive effect on behavior. Yet, evidence is assuredly mixed,90 and 
research on professional oaths is still in its infancy. Moreover, oaths may 
have undesirable side effects. A pledge to tell the truth makes people more 
likely to tell the truth indeed, but does not decrease the probability of 
making a false statement.91 In the context of corporate ethics, a potentially 
undesirable effect of emphasizing “doing good” may be that it primarily 
inspires ethical behavior at the “philanthropic” level, at the expense of 
shareholders, employees, or consumers. Similarly, oaths may be taken as 
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an indication of untrustworthiness rather than as a promotion of trust.92 
Some research also shows that publicity may negatively affect 
compliance.93 
In the end, the question of whether oaths are successful instruments 
to generate compliance through common knowledge is out in the open. I 
do still believe that I have offered strong reasons to seriously consider the 
value of common knowledge in managing ethics in organizations, even if 
admittedly concrete suggestions for implementing this idea are still to be 
produced. 
CONCLUSION 
Professional oaths have been hailed as giving an “ethical foundation” 
to business94 and as embodying “powerful idealism,”95 but they have also 
been denounced as inviting “a violation of fiduciary responsibilities” and 
a “misplaced response.”96 And, indeed, how likely is it that after you have 
sworn an oath you will be able to recall the text for the rest of your life? 
One might even think that oaths harm integrity. Well-meaning 
professionals may see an oath as a condescending expression of distrust in 
their ability to judge and act ethically and may, therefore, become cynical 
as a result. Since oaths summarize what is already contained in laws or 
codes of conduct, they may be seen as redundant or as stating the obvious. 
Oaths may be found to create an unjustified illusion of trustworthiness. 
And, perhaps most seriously, they might lead to moral error. As we saw, 
the MBA Oath deals with many of a business’s stakeholders in great detail, 
but it does not address the concerns of competitors and suppliers—which 
are admittedly easily forgotten, but unjustifiably so.97 Similarly, many 
oaths contain prescriptions to keep secret what one is entrusted with. 
However, this is unhelpful, if not straightforwardly confusing, when, for 
example, revealing secret client data may save lives. However laudable 
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such pronouncements are, they are probably best not afforded a role in an 
oath. 
A more practical objection is that generating sufficiently widespread 
awareness of the oath among its intended beneficiaries may be difficult. A 
small-scale investigation around the Bankers Oath in its early years 
showed that consumers were very unlikely to stumble upon information 
about the oath.98 Before the larger event in The Hague, if you had not seen 
or read the news, you would not have learned about the oath; at least, 
logging on to your online banking portal would do nothing in that regard.99 
But despite attention on national television and in national newspapers, 
even The Hague event failed to reach most Dutch citizens. 
A final objection is that proposing a professional oath for 
businesspeople commits oneself to an unjustified assumption that business 
(banking, financial advice, management, etc.) is a profession. Some 
scholars have indeed made suggestions in that direction,100 but their 
arguments may not convince everyone. One problem with such a view is 
that, unlike genuine professions such as medicine, business and 
management do not rest on a body of specialized technical knowledge and 
transferable skills that are acquired through years of training, maintained 
and improved over a career, and further developed based on research 
carried out primarily by members of the profession themselves. Surely 
workers in the banking industry (or the chemical industry, for that matter) 
require specific and highly technical knowledge. But the knowledge is 
fairly general: my knowledge of financial economics may qualify me for 
a job in a bank, but also for academic work. If we were to zoom in on 
management as a profession,101 we would see that training is often of little 
importance. Despite what professors may believe, one can become a great 
manager or businessperson without attending business school. A medical 
career without medical school, by contrast, is out of the question. 
What is the answer? Back to the Bankers Oath: Surely the Dutch 
realized that pledging integrity cannot be more than the starting point to 
incorporate ethics into the financial industry as a whole. The oath, though 
meant to be highly visible, was only a small part of a new and perhaps 
even more innovative regulation.102 Bank executives were explicitly 
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obligated to develop concrete policies to ensure that the principles 
embodied in the Banking Code and the Bankers Oath were translated into 
concrete and consistent practice within their organizations. The point is 
not to deny that its public and open character—its common knowledge 
generating potential—may make an oath a primary or central instrument 
to showcase an organization’s or industry’s commitment to ethics. The 
Dutch Bankers Oath, for instance, is the public embodiment of the Dutch 
Banking Code. It is a kind of public summary of the key norms and values 
that inspire it and the key commitments and duties that it creates. 
To summarize, I have argued for the following three epistemic 
(informational) claims: 
1. Knowledge of freedom increases the chances that people satisfy 
desires and assume moral responsibility for their actions. 
2. Knowledge of morality increases the chances that the desires 
people satisfy conform to morality. 
3. Common knowledge of moral commitments increases the 
chances that people stick to the moral commitments they make. 
I have used oaths primarily to illustrate (3), but I believe oaths also 
address (1) and (2). I conclude by making a number of observations about 
how we may manage ethics in organizations more generally in ways that 
incorporate the insights behind all three claims. In other words, I explore 
how the epistemic insights garnered so far can help us to incorporate 
integrity into organizations. 
A traditional, but still useful, model of ethical decision-making 
distinguishes four stages.103 One must first “recognize” the issue at stake 
and conceptualize it as calling for ethical reflection. Reflection then leads 
to a “judgment” about what action morality requires in this particular case, 
which is followed, if at all, by the formation of an “intention” to actually 
perform the action or actions that one judges to be right. Finally, if one 
carries out the intention, the result is actual ethical “behavior.” Things may 
go wrong at any of the four stages. I may fail to recognize because of a 
lack of sensitivity, awareness, concentration, or empathy. I may recognize 
but fail to judge because of lack of time, resources, ethical knowledge and 
expertise, or distraction. I may judge but not form a commitment or 
intention because I do not want to due to countervailing, selfish reasons. 
And, I may intend but not act because of weakness of will or forgetfulness. 
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Ethics management addresses all four levels: mission statements, 
corporate codes of conduct, ethics officers, compliance teams, ethics 
committees, ethics hotlines, CSR departments, ethics training, culture 
change programs, integrity consultants—these instruments are all in the 
end meant to make people recognize, judge, intend, and act with integrity. 
The epistemic perspective, I believe, offers a more general way to assess 
such initiatives and to make suggestions for improving them. The idea is 
simple: in order to recognize an issue as ethically laden and to form a 
judgment about what morality requires, you need knowledge about its 
potential consequences. You need knowledge about the alternatives, 
because as long as there are no alternatives, morality has little to say. You 
need knowledge about the consequences of these alternatives to weigh 
them against each other. In sum, you need knowledge about freedom and 
knowledge about morality. 
Knowledge about morality is often lacking. The way a case is 
presented to us may considerably distort our thinking about the “moral 
intensity” of the issue at stake through five factors.104 We tend to focus on 
consequences of great magnitude (a large accident such as an airplane 
crash versus a small accident involving employees on the work floor), that 
have relatively large probabilities, which are concentrated among a group 
of people (airplane crash versus many distinct car accidents), over which 
there is social consensus as to what morality prescribes, and which are 
sufficiently close to us socially, culturally, temporally, and so on (temporal 
immediacy and proximity). But if we focus on things that cause us to 
experience great moral intensity, then we are likely to be misled. Or, in 
behavioral economics terminology, we will suffer from cognitive bias.105 
Acquiring deeper knowledge is a way to counter such bias and avoid being 
misled, because if we deepen our knowledge of the alternatives, their 
consequences, and their morality, we are less likely to be influenced by 
irrelevant considerations that otherwise may have given an issue 
unjustifiably high (or low) moral intensity. 
Here is one concrete suggestion how we can do so: It is well-known 
from the literature on corporate social responsibility that some 
stakeholders are more prominent in corporate decision-making than 
others.106 What determines the chances of a stakeholder being recognized, 
and being included in ethical judgment, is proportional to the extent to 
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which management sees the stakeholder as possessing power, and sees 
their claims as legitimate and sufficiently urgent.107 Needless to say, 
however, there is often a clear discrepancy between management’s 
perceptions of power, legitimacy, and urgency, and what an impartial 
moral view would have to say on the matter. It may be laudable that 
HSBC’s Malaysian Forest Dialogue engages with stakeholders such as the 
World Wildlife Fund.108 But how sure can we be that the interests of poor 
individual farmers, say, or small enterprises, are also recognized and 
included in their ethical judgments, intentions, and actions? 
An epistemic perspective helps here by urging decision-makers to 
perform extensive impartial research in order to ultimately act with 
integrity. This solution may sound innocuous. It is meant to be very wide-
ranging. I am inclined to think that when you have experienced ethical 
debates in organizations, you must conclude that a great deal of moral 
decision-making in business suffers from a lack of knowledge about 
relevant facts. This conclusion is actually true both in businesses and in 
NGOs (witness the unsavory way in which Greenpeace failed to do justice 
to dissenting opinions in the Brent Star case).109 Stakeholder engagement 
may go some way to expand one’s knowledge,110 but more is clearly 
needed. 
I have elsewhere recommended the use of Deliberative Polling® as 
an alternative. Although this tool that was designed by political scientists 
and communication scholars primarily to boost buy-in in political 
decision-making,111 it may provide value in business contexts as well.112 
Suppose I need to decide about an issue and want to obtain information. I 
can send around a questionnaire to gather input, and then perhaps decide 
the issue in a majoritarian fashion; however, people may fill out 
questionnaires with different levels of expertise and knowledge of the 
issue, which may significantly decrease the reliability of the procedure. 
The idea behind a deliberative poll is that it brings people together to 
discuss, to engage experts, to learn from each other, to revise their views, 
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and then to vote. The vote will then reflect the “considered judgments” of 
the participants. 
Although decision-makers should exercise care to avoid bias in 
selecting participants, the precise setting of the poll forces decision-
makers to more carefully gather information than the usually quite rigidly 
structured stakeholder dialogues most businesses organize today. 
Deliberative polls confront decision-makers with details about the 
experiences, fears, and concerns of individual stakeholders, thus creating 
knowledge about freedom and morality. This tactic gives a voice to 
stakeholders that might otherwise be forgotten. And while a deliberative 
poll will look very different from the oath-taking ceremony this Article 
started with—it will not typically take place in a church; it will be less 
solemn, less formalized, and less ceremonial—it may well have a greater 
impact. 
I hope to have accomplished two things in this Article. First, to use 
philosophical insights on knowledge and common knowledge to argue that 
moral decision-making requires knowledge (rather than mere belief) about 
opportunities, their likely consequences, and their morality, and that 
ethical culture benefits from common knowledge because as common 
knowledge encourages people to keep their commitments, it generates 
normative expectations in the beneficiaries of these commitments. 
Ultimately, as people have awareness of these normative expectations, 
they recognize additional reasons to take action. 
Second, I hope to have shown in considerable detail how one 
business ethics instrument accomplishes these aims (particularly the aim 
of generating common knowledge). I have argued that oaths foster 
professionalism, moral deliberation, and ethical action exactly because 
they generate the relevant epistemic conditions. This approach is abstract 
for sure. But I am convinced that this abstract perspective has the potential 
to inform and inspire considerable change in the way we manage corporate 
culture in the twenty-first century. 
